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ABSTRACT
A Secure On-line Credit Card Transaction Method
Based On Kerberos Authentication Protocol
By
Jung Eun Kim
Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Computer Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Nowadays, electronic payment system is an essential part of modern business.
Credit cards or debit cards have been widely used for on-site or remote transactions,
greatly reducing the need for inconvenient cash transactions. However, there have been a
huge number of incidents of credit card frauds over the Internet due to the security
weakness of electronic payment system. A number of solutions have been proposed in
the past to prevent this problem, but most of them were inconvenient and did not satisfy
the needs of cardholders and merchants at the same time.
In this thesis, we present a new secure card payment system called NNCC (No
Number Credit Card) that significantly reduces the possibility of credit card frauds. This
scheme is primarily designed for on-line shopping. NNCC is based on the Kerberos
cryptographic framework that has been proven to be secure after being used in real world
for decades. In this proposed system, instead of card numbers, only the payment tokens
are exchanged between the buyers and merchants. The token is generated based on the
payment amount, the client information, and merchant information. However it does not
contain the credit card number, so the merchant cannot acquire and illegally use the credit
card number. A token is cryptographically secure and valid only for the designated
merchant, so it is robust against eavesdropping.
iii

This thesis describes the underlying cryptographic schemes, the operating principles,
and the system design. It explains the concept of Kerberos and the background in
Cryptography. Then it discusses the new proposed system and the associated payment
processes. We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype comprised of ecommerce
web sites, client modules, payment server, and database. We show the architecture and
protocol of the system, and discuss the performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Electronic payment system (EPS) is an essential part of modern business. Credit cards
or debit cards have been widely used for on-site or remote transactions, greatly reducing
the need for inconvenient cash transactions. Furthermore EPS has become a critical piece
for the operation of e-commerce systems where cash transactions are impractical.
However, the proliferation of EPS has brought forth an undesirable effect. The
convenience of credit cards gives a purchasing power to whoever has the card number
with some extra information associated with it. When a 3rd party person obtains the card
number, he has the same purchasing power as the legitimate owner and can falsely use
the card without the knowledge of the legitimate owner. This can happen either
inadvertently or on purpose. Merchant may store the credit card numbers insecurely and
get them stolen. Or fake web sites can be set up to grab the credit card information from
unsuspecting victims. Once the card number and the associated information are given to a
merchant, the number cannot be withdrawn. The present EPS does not provide a
mechanism to hide the credit card numbers during transactions.
Not surprisingly, there have been numerous incidents of credit card frauds over the
Internet due to the weakness of EPS. For example, on August 16, 2009, a computer
criminal named Albert Gonzalez was accused of stealing 170 million credit and ATM
card numbers and reselling them [1]. According to the data reported by Chronology of
Data Breaches, a credit card fraud incident database, on April 22, 2009, a former
employee at New York state tax department was accused of gathering secret data
including credit card numbers and using them illegally [2]. The loss from the credit card
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fraud is also large and the number of the cases is increasing. According to FBI‟s Internet
Crime Complaint Center‟s 2008 Annual Report [3], the total loss from online fraud
amounted to 265 million dollars in 2008, a 33.1% increase compared with 2007.
Obviously the situation gets worse as people shop more on-line. People give out the
credit card numbers to more e-commerce sites, which means higher chances of their
credit card number stolen. Protecting credit card numbers is thus very important to reduce
the loss. To this end, a number of solutions or protocols such as SSL [4], SET [5], and
PayPal [6] have been proposed. While some of the solutions are used currently, some
others are considered impractical. One of the challenging issues in developing a scheme
is to satisfy both groups of users, namely the cardholders and the merchants. Cardholders
do not want to directly give their card numbers to the merchants, while merchants want to
get the card number to charge the payment conveniently.
In this thesis, we present a new secure payment system that does not reveal the credit
card number to the merchant while minimizing the inconvenience. This system is based
on the Kerberos framework [26] and only tokens are exchanged between the buyers and
merchants. The tokens are generated based on the payment amount, the client information
and merchant information, but it does not contain the credit card number. So the
merchant cannot acquire and illegally use the credit card number. A token itself is
cryptographically secure and valid only for the designated merchant, so it is robust
against eavesdropping. This scheme can be best used during on-line shopping. We
describe the underlying cryptographic scheme and the system construction.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the current payment systems.
We categorize them into three groups and discuss the pros and cons of each payment
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system. Chapter 3 explains the concept of Kerberos and the background in Cryptography.
Chapter 4 discusses our proposed system and the payment processes in our system. In
chapter 5 we implement a prototype system and discuss its performance. In chapter 6, we
evaluate proposed system. Then we conclude the Thesis in chapter 7 with the list of
future works.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Generally an EPS falls into one of two categories: token based systems (Electronic
cash system, or electronic currency systems), and account-based systems (Credit-debit)
[7][8][9]. However the credit card system can be considered a separate category in some
cases. In this Thesis, we also divide the EPS into three categories because the credit card
system is most popular among the payment system.
2.1 Electronic Cash System
In electronic cash systems, customers buy digital tokens and surrender them to the
merchant when they buy an item [7]. Electronic cash systems are further divided into
two systems: smart card-based systems which use smart cards to store E-Cash, and Web
Cash where user‟s E-Cash is stored in users‟ online account. The smart card-based
system is not suitable for Internet Payment System due to the need for a physical contact
to make a payment. Web Cash systems do not suffer from this problem and there are
several systems proposed, e.g., Millicent Protocol [10], PayWord [11] and MicroMint
[11], NetCash [12], eCash (or DigiCash) invented by David Chaum [13], and so forth.
Millicent Protocol is designed to process the small amount of money which can be a
fraction of cents for the inexpensive internet contents. The most important parts of
Millicent Protocol are Broker and Scrip. Broker provides account management and
billing, and Scrip is digital cash which is valid for the specific merchant [10].
PayWord is credit-based. Customers need digital certificate signed by a broker.
Digital certificate consists of customer‟s name, Broker name, public key which is used
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for signature verification and so forth. PayWord shows its strong efficiency in the
multiple transactions to the same merchant [11].
In MicroMint system, a coin is essential factor. A Broker sells coins to user, and
customers give coins to merchants as payment. Merchants return tokens to the broker to
get money. The validity of token is easily checked, but it is almost impossible to forge it
[11].
Net Cash provides anonymous transaction and real time payment processing under
multiple server environments [12].
DigiCash (or eCash) is based on the RSA blinding signature in which the content of
payment token is unknown to its signer. It provides public verification to its participants.
Usually, this scheme is used where the owner and signer of token or message are
different [13].
The advantage of Token based systems is that anonymous transactions are possible in
some systems. For example, in DigiCash , it is impossible to know to whom a specific
token was issued because the content of token is blind before it is signed by bank [13].
Also, transaction processing is efficient because the exchange of tokens is performed
locally without connecting a remote transaction server [7]. However, ECS still needs to
maintain a large database of past transactions to prevent double spending from a single
token. Furthermore, it is required for both customers and merchants to purchase and
install hardware and software to deal with electronic tokens which is burden to them and
made it not widely used [8].
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2.2 Account Based Systems
In the account-based system, the exchange of money between users‟ accounts is
performed by a payment service provider [7][8]. The examples of Account-Based
systems include PayPal [6], Netbill [14], NetCheque [15], and so forth
PayPal is a very popular service for web-based transactions. PayPal users can send or
receive money by using their email address. It is widely used in C2C (Customer-tocustomer) transactions but can be also used in B2C (Business-to-customer) transactions
[6] [16]. PayPal does not reveal the detailed account information of the transaction
partner to the other users; its transactions assure some privacy. However, its
authentication scheme is primitive and several ways are known to hack PayPal‟s ID
easily using the Internet. Also, the management company of PayPal system seems to be a
risk factor because it could go bankrupt with users‟ money. Also PayPal requires Credit
Card Number to deposit money to the PayPal account, thus it has the same problems as
credit card payment models have.
Net bill is designed for micro-payments, i.e., a small amount such as a fraction of a
dollar, especially for information content delivered over the Internet. However, Net bill
is currently a theoretical system and hasn‟t been deployed yet [14].
NetCheque is a distributed accounting service. Users of NetCheque have accounts on
account servers. When a customer buys an item, they write an electronic document (a
check) with electronic signature, and then send it to the merchant [15]. NetCheque is
based on the Kerberos concept [24] and Electronic Check. It is the first attempt to apply
the Kerberos concept to a payment system, which allows the system to maintain high
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security and reliability. However, NetCheck is not considered practical and hasn‟t been
implemented in the industry.
2.3 Credit (or debit) Card Payment Model
The greatest difference between an account-based system and a credit card payment
system is that customers do not need to make an account to use a credit card system, and
credit card information is the only thing needed for authentication [7][8]. This model is
most widely used in the Internet due to its simplicity and convenience for customers.
However, due to this simple authentication scheme, it results in numerous problems such
as credit card fraud and counterfeiting. The purpose of our proposed system is fully
utilizing the benefits of the credit card system, while removing this vulnerability by not
using the credit card number directly. Therefore it is necessary to understand how credit
card system operates currently.
2.3.1 Card Payment Processing Network

Figure 1 Current Payment process under Credit Card Payment Model

As shown Figure 1, several elements are involved with the Card Payment Networks.
Payment Gateway provides connectivity between Merchant (i.e. Payment site) and
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Processor (i.e. Financial Networks). The Processor is a large data center which processes
credit card transactions. This is how payment processing works [17].
1) A customer submits a card number to the merchant.
2) Merchant sends payment information such as card number and amount of
money to Payment Gateway.
3) Payment Gateway passes the information from merchant to processor.
4) Processor sends the information to customer‟s bank.
5) Customer‟s bank sends transaction result (approved or rejected) to the
processor.
6) Processor passes the transaction result to the payment gateway.
7) Payment gateway sends the transaction information to the merchant.
8) Merchant saves transaction information for the settlement and sends
confirmation number to the customer.
In step 8), the money is not transferred from the money to the merchant‟s bank at the
moment of card processing. Instead, settlement is delivered to the merchant‟s bank for
later processing. Settlement is a merchant‟s electronic bookkeeping for the transaction of
the payment information.
2.3.2 Protocols for Secure Transaction of Credit Cards
As shown Figure 1, a credit card number should be sent over the Internet. To make it
secure between each element, especially between the customer (i.e., the card holder) and
the Merchant, a number of methods have been suggested. To prevent eavesdropping
during the transmission process, the transaction information is encrypted using SSL
(Secure Socket Layer). SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is a very popular web content
8

encryption technology, not a payment protocol, and virtually all credit card transactions
are encrypted using SSL nowadays. SSL employs asymmetric key encryption for the
communication between customers and merchants, and allows the user to authenticate the
identity of the merchant using digital certificate [4]. In many cases, the credit card
numbers are stored at merchant‟s database either on purpose or by negligence. So, there
is a possibility that the database is cracked by hacker or used illegally by insiders on the
merchant side. Most of card numbers fraud comes from this. Besides, recently SSL
based on HTTP (-HTTPS) could be hacked by several tools such as sslstrip which can
trick Web Browsers into thinking they are on a secure site [18][19].
SET (Secure Electronic Transaction) is security protocol for the card payment over
the Internet proposed by Visa, MasterCard, and other companies. It consists of five
protocols (cardholder registration, merchant registration, purchase request, payment
authorization, and payment capture) [5]. Unlike SSL, SET prevents merchants from using
customer‟s credit card number illegally because cardholder shares order information with
merchant and shares payment information only with bank (dual signature). However,
SET failed to be implemented in the industry due to its complexity which gave burden to
the customers.
The concept of one-time Credit card number (deposable number, single-use number)
[20] is recently used in the market place such as American Express, Discover, MBNA,
and Visa‟s Gift Cards [21]. One-time credit card number is only for single use. After
using single-use number, illegal use of the card number is impossible. From this way,
customers do not need to worry about credit card number theft. However, whenever they
buy things, customers should have online connection with card issuer to have new card
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number which is burden to both customers and card issuers. To solve this problem,
Yingjiu Li proposed one-time payment scheme which generate card numbers with hash
function [22]. However, in this scheme, we cannot use current credit card because it
require smart card reader.
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CHAPTER 3
TECHNICAL BACKGROUNDS
3.1 Cryptography and Mcrypt
Cryptography is hiding information [23]. When Alice wants to share information
only with Bob, she encrypts the original data (plaintext) with her key and sends it
(encrypted data – cipher text) to Bob. Bob can read the cipher text by decrypting it with
his key. Anyone else Bob and Alice cannot share the information without specific key.
This is how Cryptography works. We can divide cryptography algorithm into two groups
– symmetry key and asymmetry key. In a symmetry key system, we encrypt and decrypt
data with same key. AES, DES, RC4 and so forth belongs to symmetry key system.
Unlike symmetry system in an asymmetry key (called also public-key) system, we use
different key for encryption and decryption of data. RSA is an example of asymmetry
key.
Hash function is used in the cryptography for the integrity of data. It gets block of
data as its argument and returns a bit string called hash value or message digest. This
value is used to check of the data modification detect by adding it to the end of the data at
the sender‟s side and by comparing hash value from sender and new hash value generate
by a receiver. SHA1 and MD5 is an example of cryptographic has function.
There are lots of secured Cryptography algorithms, and some programming libraries
offer these algorithms. Mcrypt is an open source implementation of cryptography
algorithm library which includes symmetric-key, hash, and public-key algorithms [24].
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3.2 Kerberos
Kerberos is designed at MIT to protect network services provided by Project Athena.
Currently, we use Kerberos Version 5 defined in RFC 4210.
It is authentication protocol to prove client‟s identity attempting to log on server and
encrypts their communications through secret-key cryptography for an unsecure network
[25][26]. It never sends password over the network, so the password is protected against
*eavesdropping and *replay attacks. It also solves Key Distribution problems between
client and server with Ticket.


Eavesdropping attacks (Man-in-the-middle attack) - attacker makes independent
connections with the victims and relays messages between them, making them
believe that they are talking directly to each other.



Replay attack - a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or
delayed.

It requires additional servers -Authentication Server, and Ticket-Granting Server.
When client is authenticated, it gets TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket) from Authentication
Server. With TGT, client can get Ticket for specific server from a Ticket-Granting
Server. With Ticket, client can login application server.
The advantage of Kerberos system is that a user does not need to register in each
server, and each server does not need to have each user‟s username and password in their
storage.
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Figure 2 Kerberos System

3.2.1 Participants of Kerberos


Client (user)



S: Application Server



Authentication server (AS) – check whether a user is registered in system and
generates Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). It does not care about how many
application servers are in the system.



Ticket Granting Server (TGS) – verify TGT and issue Ticket. It does not care
how many users are registered in the system.



Ticket: Kerberos data structure that can be safely sent across the networks.
When the ticket is valid, the sender of it can prove its identity.



Ticket has two properties like this.
o All tickets in Kerberos are encrypted with the key of the final recipient.
o Client has no knowledge of the tickets‟ content.
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3.2.2 Keys in Kerberos

Figure 3 Keys in Kerberos

As shown above, different keys are shared between elements.
Notation


KAB : Secret Key between A and B



{Clear Text} KAB : clear text encrypted with key KAB



KAS,TGS , KAS,C , KTGS,S is pre-defined, and KC,TGS, KC,S is dynamically
generated



NC and N‟C are a nonce generated by Client



Nonce: A randomly chosen value, different from previous choices, inserted in
a message to protect against replays.



Lk: ticket lifetime (valid period).



Tk : Time Stamp.
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3.2.3 Flow of Kerberos
0) User enters ID and Password (Password is secret key between Client and AS).
1) Client sends TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) request message to the AS.

Figure 4-A Data Flow from Client to AS in Kerberos

„From‟ and „to‟: time interval used for Key validation.
2) When AS receives message, AS checks if the user is in the database. If the user
exists, AS generates session key (KC,TGS) and TGT , and sends them into message
composed with 2 parts to the client.

Figure 4-B Data Flow from AS to Client in Kerberos

As shown step 1, 2 Password is never sent over the network. It is used as a Key for
encryption and decryption.
3) Clients receive message from AS, and encrypt the second message with Password
(KAS,C) to get a session Key(KC,TGS) and other information. After then, client sends
message including TGT after encrypting it with KC,TGS to the TGS.
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Figure 4-C Data Flow from Client to TGS in Kerberos

4) TGS receives message from the client and with TGT from which it gets KC,TGS.
And then TGS decrypt the rest of message. If TGS is valid, it generates Ticket and
Client/server session key (KC,TGS ) and send them to the client.

Figure 4-D Data Flow from TGS to Client in Kerberos

5) After getting message from TGS, Client sends Ticket to Server to get access
permission to server.

Figure 4-E Data Flow from Client to Server in Kerberos
6) Server sends Confirmation Message encrypted with Client/server session key (KC,S)
if Ticket is valid.
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Figure 4-F Data Flow from Server to Client in Kerberos

3.3 SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and Open SSL
The SSL is used for secure communication over a network which works on
Transport Layer between two applications. It is based on public key cryptography to
accomplish its tasks, and provides server authentication and encrypted data
communication channel. It uses digital certificate for certification of participants,
especially server. SSL guarantee higher security providing Confidentiality, Identity
authentication, and Message integrity verification [4]. Open SSL is an open source
implementation of SSL [27]. Open SSL is multi-platform library which supports C and
C++.
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CHAPTER 4
SECURE ON-LINE CREDIT CARD TRANSACTION METHOD
As we discuss chapter 3, Kerberos system is very secure and reliable [26]. Some
payment protocols such as NetCheque [15] are suggested based on this protocol.
However, they are theoretical and never implemented industry domain. Our solution is
also based on Kerberos, but we modify the protocol to make it practical payment system.
So our new system works under current card payment network and card holders and
merchants can easily migrate from current payment process to our system with minor
change.

Figure 5 - A System flow of NNCC

This new system looks similar to Kerberos because of its structure. You can regard
customer as client, PAS as AS, PGS as TGS, and merchant as server in Kerberos.
However, it has several different things. First, the operation sequence is different. Second,

18

it does not have key between merchant and customer while Kerberos has key between
client and server. Third, it has new communication relationship between merchant and
PGS. Fourth, it has reverse operation (refund operation). Besides, its token contents are
totally different from the content of Kerberos Ticket.

Figure 5 - B System Flow of NNCC with Actual Data

As shown Figure 1, in current card payment flow, customer is connected to merchant
and merchant is linked with Payment Gateway. In our solution illustrated by Figure 4-A
and 4-B , PGS server (TGS server in Kerberos) which replaces Payment Gateway is
connected to both customer and merchant together unlike current payment system.
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Figure 6 Keys in NNCC

Two tokens are used – Session Tokens and Payment Tokens.
Session Token means the authorization of customer like TGT in Kerberos.
Payment Token contains information of client and merchant, and the amount of
money paid.

Figure 7 Sequence Diagram of NNCC for Payment
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The rough process is like this. First of all, customer sends card information to the
PAS server, and gets a session token. After that, Customer sends payment information
(the amount of money and merchant name) with session token to the PGS instead of
merchant, and gets Payment Token from PGS. And then, customer sends Payment Token
to the merchant. Last, to make actual payment, merchant sends transaction number
included in Payment Token to PGS server. Payment token is also used for merchant‟s
settlement processing afterwards. After PGS receives transaction number, it proceeds
actual payment processing.
4.1 Advantage of the System
The advantages of Kerberos system becomes those of this payment system. User
does not need to send card information to the each merchant and merchant does not need
to have user card information. This prevents merchant or its employee from stealing
customers‟ card information because merchant cannot save card information in its
database. Under this flow, Credit card number encrypted with user password is sent to
PAS. So even if card number is known to other, he or she cannot get session Token from
Payer Authentication Server without knowing user‟s password which is pre-registered
through the trust path. In other words, he or she cannot get payment Token. Also, mutual
authentication is implemented among payment systems, merchant and customer because
each participant needs to know its shared key to communicate with each other. So,
merchant can verify whether the customer is an actual owner or not. This is important
because the merchant is entirely responsible for the loss from the card number theft in
some countries. Furthermore, Merchant cannot modify payment information under this
system.
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We are also sure that the migration from current existing system to our new system is
easy and simple. Customer only needs to download tiny software program, and merchant
just need to send transaction number in the Payment Token from the customer, instead of
card information and the amount to the Payment Gateway (Payment Granting Server).
This is important because several secure payment system has been proposed, but they are
not implemented in the industry because of its complexity or burden to customer and
merchant.
4.2 Scenario
4.2.1 Payment
Detailed payment process is like this.
1) User enters ID, card Information and Password (Password become Key between
Client and PAS).
2) Client sends data (ID, card Information) after encrypting them with user password.

Figure 8-A Data Flow from Client to PAS in NNCC

„from‟ and „to‟ indicates a specified time interval.
3) PAS process user request as like this
a. Check whether user is registered or not. If registered, decrypt message.
b. Card information is registered to the database. The information is
automatically deleted on the time when session token is expired in client side.
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c. Generate session token and send it to the client.

Figure 8-B Data Flow from PAS to Client in NNCC

4) Customer decides to purchase things.
5) Merchant sends Amount and Merchant ID to Customer.
6) Client Program sends Payment Information such as Merchant ID and amount of
money encrypted with key and session token to PGS server.

Figure 8-C Data Flow from Client to PGS in NNCC

7) PGS work like this.
a. Check if Session token is valid.
b. Generate transaction information (amount, customer, merchant etc) on the
database.
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c. Generate Key shared between merchant and client, and Payment Token for
merchant.
d. Send Key (KC,M) and Payment Token to the Client.

Figure 8-D Data Flow from PGS to Client in NNCC

8) Client sends Payment Token to the merchant.

Figure 8-E Data Flow from Client to Merchant in NNCC

9) Merchant extracts Transaction number from the Payment Token and sends with
amount to PGS server.

Figure 8-F Data Flow from Merchant to PGS in NNCC
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10) After PGS server getting Transaction number from the merchant, actual payment
process starts.
a. From the Transaction number, PGS server retrieves Payment Information
(card #, amount, merchant ID) from its database.
b. PGS sends the Information to the Processor.
11) Processor request services to Client‟s bank.
12) Customer‟s Bank response to the Processor (Accept or Reject).
13) PGS receives confirmation number from the Processor.
14) PGS sends confirmation number to the merchant.

Figure 8-G Data Flow from PGS to Merchant in NNCC

15) The merchant sends this number to the client.

Figure 8-H Data Flow from Merchant to Client in NNCC
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Stage 0, 1, 2 is the process of getting session token. If a client has a valid session
token, it does not need to get a new session token as long as the session token is valid.
However, it has to request payment token every payment process.
4.2.2 Refund
Refund is a just reverse process of payment. We assume client has a valid session
token. Customer can get session token without credit card number, because refund
process does not require card information but transaction Reference Number.

Figure 9 Sequence Diagram of NNCC for REFUND

0) Customer claims a refund.
1) Merchant requests Refund Token to PGS.
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Figure 10-A Data flow from Merchant to PGS in NNCC for Refund

2) After getting request, PGS sends REFUND token and data to the Merchant.

Figure 10-B Data flow from PGS to Merchant in NNCC for Refund

3) Merchant sends “REFUND TOKEN” to the Client.

Figure 10-C Data flow from Merchant to Client in NNCC for Refund

4) Client sends Transaction number and amount to the PGS after getting “REFUND
TOKEN”.

Figure 10-D Data flow from Client to PGS in NNCC for Refund
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5) After PGS server getting Transaction number from the client, actual REFUND
process starts.
a. From the Transaction number, PGS server retrieves Payment Information
(Transaction Reference Number, amount, merchant ID, UID) from its database.
b. PGS sends the information to the Process
After several steps, PGS receives confirmation number from the Processor.
6) PGS sends confirmation number to the client.

Figure 10-E Data flow from PGS to Client in NNCC for Refund

4.2.3 Installment (Periodic Payment)
In the current payment system, Installment through the Credit Card Company
requires additional Interest. Besides, Debit card does not allow it. In our system, we can
provide this function without Interest to customer s regardless of their card type (debit or
credit). The idea is simple. PGS has additional information on its database for this (refer
to database structure 5.5.3). PGS will do most of work. At the first payment, PGS use
customer‟s credit card number. From second payment, PGS will use Transaction
Reference Number of previous transaction which does not require customer‟s credit card
number. Actual process will be same with the general payment Process to both customer
and merchant. Customer just needs to request TOKEN for Installment instead of general
payment. We can think two cases for Installment – real Installment or periodic payment.
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Figure 11-A TOKEN for Installment

Figure 11-A shows Token for Installment. PGS will divide the Amount with n (the
value of „times‟) and request payment with the quotient to the processor for n times.

Figure 11-B TOKEN for Periodic Payment

Figure 11-B shows Token for Periodic Payment. PGS will request payment with the
amount to the processor every „cycle‟.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed protocol is implemented using C. We use Crypt library for the
encryption and open SSL library for data communication. To show all the payment
process during the payment process, we install open source shopping mall package
written in PHP and modify it to link our payment system. PAS and PGS module works
under both UNIX and Windows system. PAS and PGS could be physically separated
depending on database type. In this chapter, we describe how we implement our system
in detail.
5.1 System Organization

Figure 12 Sequence Diagram of NNCC for REFUND
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The connection between customer and Merchant is based on HTTPS or HTTP.
Merchant keeps connection to the PGS continuously for the efficiency.
5.2 Data Transfer Modules
To achieve highest secure channel among the element, we implement new data
communication module. In new module, we use two functions - Send and Recvline.
Figure 9, shows protocol stack of this library.

Figure 13 Data Communication Layer of NNCC

5.2.1 Randomization of Cryptography Algorithm
Encryption method (or algorithm) is also random. MCrypt library we are using in
our program provides a lot of encryption algorithms. If we use one of them continuously,
there could be possibility of password cracking by Guessing, dictionary and brute force
attacks. To decrease the possibility of this attack, we can choose an algorithm at random
when each element sends data to other. Before we send data, we put the 2bit flag (called
num) to indicate which algorithm is used.
5.2.2 Data Transfer with SSL
To maintain most secure channel among elements in the system, we can use SSL
protocol in our communication. It means that we encrypt data with key, the encrypted
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data is transferred under [27] open-SSL library instead of socket library. Figure 13
shows the implementation of 5.2.1 and 5.2.
5.3 Token in Real System
Normally, when we send well-organized data, we use structure (or class) in the
programming. We read and write data by structure. However, in our system we
represent data in other way. Each data ends with newline, and fields in each data group
are distinguished with special character. Before sending data, we encrypt the data,
change the encrypted data into hexadecimal value, and we add hash value of the data to
check data modification during the transmission. We also generate token in this way.
5.3.1 Session Token
Table 1 Session Token
KC,PGS

Valid Until

UID

Key between client and PGS

The time Token expires

User ID

Abcdef

OCT 10 2009 13:00

Vista

Session Token data
Token after encryption

abcdef||OCT 10 2009 13:00||Vista
8c3c6438dd4de73f9cb536252894d293318e17e57958a41ef0fff903240314c4

As shown in Table 1, session token in NNCC is similar to session ticket in Kerberos
except for that fact token in NNCC has hash value at the end of it. With hash value, we
can check the integrity of token.
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5.3.2 (Payment) Token
Table 2 (Payment) Token
KC,M
Key

Abcdef

L2

Valid Until

Trans#

UID

MID

AMT

TIMES

CYCLE

Time

The time

Transaction

USER

Merchant

Amount

Number of

Period of

stamp

token expires

Number

ID

ID

(price)

Installment

Payment

2 am

Oct 10…

100

vista

eBay

$50

1

0

Token data

Abcdef||2 am||oct 10 2009 13:30||100||vista||eBay||$50||1||0

Token

ac080b691f5f32fc4e9a4913e52b799d6d4b82d91af6db87fb44c8ef07a4777bac57222

after encryption

710b2cbc31e0df4e0b2ae917e1c28881481860244149c2b1b

Payment token in NNCC is totally different from ticket in the Kerberos. Payment
token has fields related to payment while ticket has data for the access of the system.
Also, final recipient of payment token is a merchant or customer while that of ticket in
Kerberos is only server. Because of this, NNCC could be applied to B2B, C2C as well as
C2B.
5.4 Keyboard Interface
Attackers can steal information by installing Key logger software in a user‟s
computer. Key logger software catches keyboard input by interrupting key board message,
and sends it to an attacker. In our system, we do not allow keyboard input in registering
card number from a keyboard directly and provides button interface for it instead.
However, each button always has same value; it could be cracked by another malware. So,
we change value of each button whenever a user clicks a button.
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Figure 14 Number Input Interface against Key Logger

5.5 Database Structure
These are database schema we are proposing in NNCC.
5.5.1 User Table
Table 3 User Table
UID

NAME

Password

User login ID

User Name

KPAS,C

Vista

JUNG EUN KIM

123

When PAS receives message from a client, it needs KPAS,C to decrypt the message.
From the user table, PAS gets KPAS,C of the client. (* 4.2.1 – 1)
In real system, KPAS,C should be encrypted
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Figure 15 User Table in mySQL

5.5.2 Card Information Table
Table 4 Card Information Table
UID

CNUM

EXP

Availability

User login ID

Card Number

Card expiration date

Valid Until

Vista

1234

June 10 2009

17 sep 19:30

Each row is automatically deleted on the specific time (the value of availability field).

When PAS decrypts card information, it inserts the information in this table and
generates Session Token. The value of “availability” field in a each row is the same with
that in the session token. (i.e when the session token expires, the related row in this table
is deleted at the same time) (*4.2.1 – 2)
When PGS sends Transaction Information to the processor, it uses this table to
retrieve card information. (*4.2.1 – 9)
In the real system, we need to encrypt card information table.
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Figure 16 Card Information Table in mySQL
5.5.3 Transaction Table
TABLE 5 Transaction Table
TYPE
Transaction

SEQ

UID

Transaction

User

MID
Merchant

CNUM

Amount

Number

Transaction type:

ID

ID

TxnRef

Confirmation

status

Transaction
Amount

Type

Availability

Valid Until

Number

Reference

Normal: N Refund: R Installment: I

Status: Waiting (for request) :W Processed: P N: newly triggered by Installment
TxnRef : Transaction Reference Number ( returned by Processor used Refund )

When PGS receives Token request message including amount, merchant ID from a
client, it inserts information in this table and generates Token.

(4.2.1 – 6)

When PGS receives Transaction number from a merchant (4.2.1 – 8), sends Transaction
Information to the processor in order to make actual payment (4.2.1 – 9) after joining
Card Information Table and Transaction Table.
This is an example of actual data in the Transaction Table.
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TABLE 6 Transaction Table Example
TYPE

SEQ

UID

MID

CNUM

Amount

Availability

TXNREF

Status

N

1

Vista

eBay

NULL

$50.00

17-01 19:30

NULL

W

N

2

Ms

eBay

4A2BC

$30.00

NULL

1237367

P

R

3

Ta

Yahoo

A1313

$30.00

NULL

4646788

P

Transaction (SEQ) 1: Payment Token is issued to the client (vista), but PGS does
not receive transaction umber from the merchant (yahoo). When PGS receives
transaction number (1), it will send the processor all the information including customer‟s
(vista) card information from the card information table
Ex) – [1234567890/June 10 2011/yahoo.com/$50.00]
Transaction 2: Payment Token was issued and PGS got transaction number from
eBay.
Transaction 3: Refund Token was issued to yahoo and PGS got transaction number
from the customer.

Figure 17 Transaction Table in MySQL
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5.6 Demonstration
In this chapter, we will show how our payment system works
5.6.1 Session Token Generation

Figure 18 Session Token Generation

As you see in Figure 18, we need to input card information, ID, and Key to get a
session token. We do not need to get the session token as long as we have valid one.
5.6.2 Payment Token Generation

Figure 19 Payment Token Generation
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We can get Payment Token if we have valid session token. To acquire payment
token, we need to give Merchant ID and amount of money. After getting Payment Token,
it is automatically saved in the clipboard.
5.6.3 Payment Process

Figure 20–A E-Commerce Site Using NNCC

Figure 20–B Billing Information in the E-Commerce Site Using NNCC
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Figure 20-A and 20-B show a payment page of E-commerce site using NNCC.
Instead of giving card information, we pass payment token to the page. Passing payment
token to the edit box is easily done by copying the token in the clipboard.
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CHAPTER 6
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
6.1 Security Analysis
6.1.1 Attack by Hacker


Packet Sniffing (Password Guessing Attack)

All the data is transferred over the SSL in our system. SSL can be cracked with
password guessing attack. However, if the Key of SSL Key is 128 bits, it is almost
impossible to crack the SSL communication. Unfortunately, even if SSL is cracked
within a very short time by chance, the attacker has another challenge to decrypt the
message or token also decrypted with other algorithm. It means that Packet sniffing is
impossible against our system while Kerberos Ticket and message are vulnerable against
offline password guessing attack.


Replay Attack

Replay attack in Kerberos between client and server which intercepts Ticket for
server and reuse it later seems to be impossible because of time stamp in the ticket.
However, if two systems‟ time clocks are different, it could be possible. Besides,
according to Kasslin and Tikkanen‟s research, Replay attack exists against SMB and
Kerberos 5 on a Windows domain [28].
In NNCC, even without time stamp, replay attack is impossible because Payment
token is for the single use. Payment token has transaction number on it, so after merchant
sends it to the PGS and PGS processes it, the token with the transaction number is invalid.
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Database stealing

Merchants‟ databases do not have any card information, so an attack to such merchant
is useless. Attacker also will target our server. We delete card information in the
database when user‟s session token expires. So, attacker cannot get much card
information from the database. Also, each card‟s information is divided to several data
unit; each unit is encrypted before being saved to the database. These will make very
difficult for attacker bring customers‟ complete card information within short time.
6.1.2 Fraud by Customer
A customer can cheat a merchant. The key KPGS,M might be guessed by clients
because the key is fixed. In this case, customer requests Payment Token with less money
than merchant ask for, and then send it merchant after changing the amount in the token
to the amount merchant asked. We can solve this problem easily. If a merchant sends
transaction number with the amount in the token to the PGS, we can know if the payment
Token is modified or not.
6.1.3 Fraud by Merchant
It is impossible in our system because merchant does have customer‟s credit card
number and does not decide the amount of money in the payment Token.
6.2 Communication Cost Comparison
In this section, we show the communication cost (size of data transferred) of our
system compared to current SSL based payment system. We ignore the overhead from
the SSL and other data. We just focus on the data needed to card transaction. We assume
that the amount of data between Payment Gateway and Merchant is at least 400 bytes as
the result of searching some payment Gateway libraries [29].
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6.2.1 Client
Table 7 Client‟s Communication Cost in NNCC
From Client

To the Client

Total

PAS

32 (card) + 32 (etc)

32 (Session Token)

96 bytes

PGS

32 (Session Token)

64 (Token)

96 bytes

8 (confirmation )

72 bytes

Merchant

64 (Token)

Total

264(*168 ) bytes

*If a customer has a session, he or she does not need to connect PAS.
Table 8 Client‟s Communication Cost in Current System
From Client
Merchant

32 (card information)

To the Client

Total

8(Confirmation)

40 bytes

As you shown in Table 8, client on the SSL-based system (40bytes) is more efficient
than ours (264 bytes). However, the size of data is lower than 1k bytes. In other world,
this difference does not make any inconvenience to customers.
6.2.2. Merchant
Table 9 Communication of Merchant in NNCC
From Merchant

To the Merchant

Total

Client

8 bytes

64 bytes

72 bytes

PGS

16 bytes

8 bytes

24 bytes
96 bytes
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Table 10 Merchant‟s Communication Cost in Current System

Client

From Merchant

To the Merchant

Total

8 bytes

32 bytes

40 bytes

Payment Gateway

400 bytes
440 bytes

In merchant sides, our system (96 bytes) is much more efficient than current existing
system (440 bytes).
6.2.3 Payment Gateway (PGS)
Table 11 Communication Cost of PGS in NNCC
From PGS

To PGS

Total

Client

64 bytes

32 bytes

96 bytes

Merchant

8 bytes

16 bytes

24 bytes
120 bytes

Table 12 Payment Gateway‟s Communication Cost in Current System
From P.G

To P.G

Merchant

Total
400 bytes

Even if our PGS have to process two requests for one transaction, the total amount
of data for PGS is much less than payment gateway in the current system.
6.3 Client (User) Input Cost Comparison
In this section, we will show that the number of key input in our system is less than
in Current Payment system in the payment process.
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Figure 21 Key Inputs under Credit Card Payment Model

As you know, we need to give card holders name, card number, expiration date, and
3 digit security codes in the current SSL-based payment system. Sometimes merchant
also ask 5 digit zip codes. If we assume our name consists of 10 characters, we need to
type at least 34 characters.

Figure 22 Key Inputs under NNCC

In our system, we only need merchant ID and Amount of money to make a payment
in case we have valid session token. Besides, we can give payment token to the merchant
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with just one key input because token is copied into clipboard. From this, we just need at
most 14 characters input to make payment. If we do not have valid session token, we
need to type 23 characters more which make total input 37 characters.
6.4 Processing Cost
Server should allow concurrent users to request service for the customers‟ satisfaction.
PAS and PGS are also designed to process multiple requests concurrently. Each request
will hold server resource and compete with other requests, which delays response time to
each client (customer). Processing time in PAS or PGS divided into three parts –
communication time, time to perform cryptography algorithm, and the payment
processing time.
In this section, we will show the average processing time of PAS and PGS for each
request. We execute client, PAS and PGS at the same server during the measurement
process. We found that when number of concurrent user increase, the processing time
also increases. However, even if the processing time increases, it will not give customers
inconvenience because the increased time is still less than 0.1 second. If we separate PAS,
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PGS and client, we will get better performance.
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Figure 23-A Average Processing Time per Request in PAS
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Figure 23-B Average Processing Time per Request in PGS
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
It is obvious that if we do not provide credit card numbers to the merchants during the
electronic payment, we can tremendously decrease the number of credit card fraud. To
acquire this goal, we implement new payment system (called NNCC) based on Kerberos
framework which has been proven to be secure. In the proposed system, payment tokens
are passed into the merchant instead of card information. So the merchant or a database
hacker cannot acquire and illegally use the credit card number. Besides, a token is
cryptographically secure and valid only for the designated merchant, so it is robust
against eavesdropping. Our approach can be applied to current card payment system with
minor modification of current payment workflow by sending token to the Payment
Gateway instead of credit card information in the merchant side. From this, we can
conclude that NNCC is secure and reliable credit card payment system which can be
easily implemented in the current Electronic Payment System.
7.2 Future Work
We show that the proposed system works practically in the current card payment
environment. However, to be widely used, we need to implement NNCC in the
distributed environment in order to process millions of transactions in a second and to
provide more convenient user interface to the customers.
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